

# HIDDEN URBANITIES:

## South Africa's Displaced Settlements 30 Years After The Abolition Of Influx Control



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# FOREWORD

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This study forms the third in a series of exploratory papers that seek to find understanding and give practical expression to what is meant by the 'differentiated approach to governance.' In 2012, we worked with strategic partners to define South Africa's 'secondary cities'. In 2014, we went further and undertook a deeper qualitative study into six secondary or intermediary cities, in an effort to find what might be different or unique about these places compared to, for example, metropolitan municipalities.

This issue of differentiation is becoming increasingly important, as shown by the forthcoming Global Report on Decentralization and Local Democracy (GOLD IV). United Cities and Local Governments (UCLG) has also established an international Working Group and is consolidating a position on intermediate cities to be included in Habitat III (UN Habitat),

We are pleasantly surprised to find that, through this series of exploratory studies, South Africa is a significant contributor to the global discourse on the subject, as a result of our early empirical and intellectual efforts. Indeed, this is the kind of space that the South African Cities Network has always sought to occupy – that of contributing to defining and seeking answers to local questions and issues, while linking into the global communities of practice that have an interest in urban governance issues.

Locally, we continue to view the explorations, analyses and debates on differentiation as important for achieving a holistic urban agenda. With the ratification of South Africa's first Integrated Urban Development Framework ([www.iudf.net](http://www.iudf.net)), we hope that we are getting closer to consolidating some knowledge-based, insightful positions about how spatial development and transformation can be achieved meaningfully, and for all, across the various urban spaces.

As always, we look forward to continuing the explorations and conversations.



Sithole Mbanga  
*CEO, SA Cities Network*

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# EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

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Apartheid planning left South Africa with a distinctive spatial legacy. Influx control, forced removals and channelled urbanisation were instrumental in preventing blacks from living in the core urban areas of South Africa. R293 towns were created expressly to channel black urbanisation away from the core urban areas to these 'displaced settlements' located behind so-called 'homeland' boundaries. These settlements are also sometimes referred to as 'hidden urbanities', describing how the apartheid government tried to hide the urbanisation of black people behind homeland boundaries. They differ from the 'black township' areas created under apartheid, mainly because most of them are further away from economic core areas. The government introduced incentives, including transport subsidies and tax holidays, to encourage companies to locate in these areas. However, post-apartheid, the subsidies were discontinued, leading to companies disinvesting from many of these settlements.

Four case studies were selected to provide a geographical spread. Three case studies were chosen because of their functional location in relation to existing metropolitan areas, while the fourth case study was chosen because of its linkages with a secondary city.

## CASE STUDIES

In 1979, **Botshabelo (Mangaung)** was created some 55 km east of Bloemfontein to divert black urbanisation from Mangaung, Bloemfontein's historically black township. Post-apartheid, manufacturing declined, as subsidies fell away, and population growth has been slow, especially compared to the substantial population growth in Bloemfontein. There was (and still is) pressure from within Botshabelo to have the area declared a 'special urban development node', but this has not happened. With the amalgamation of Botshabelo with Bloemfontein to form one local government structure, considerable investments were made in local services. However, investment in basic services – in itself a significant driver of investment in housing – together with a continued bus subsidy may have served to reinforce the spatial deprivation created under apartheid.

In 1959, **Mdantsane (Buffalo City)** was created halfway between East London and King William's Town in order to channel urbanisation from Duncan Village (East London's original black township) to behind the Ciskei border. The Regional Industrial Decentralisation Programme led to the establishment of highly subsidised border industries from 1962 and increased employment – nearly 40 000 job opportunities by the end of the 1980s. However, from the 1990s, with the withdrawal of subsidies, employment declined to just over 10 000 jobs in 2013. Post-apartheid, East London and Mdantsane were amalgamated to form one local government structure – the East London Transitional Local Council, and in 2001 Mdantsane was declared an urban renewal node. Access to basic services (water, sanitation and electricity) has improved, but the quality of schools is poor. Despite the large-scale exodus of industries, significant public-sector investment has occurred through urban renewal projects. However, as in the case of Botshabelo, the question is whether increased investment in basic services only serves to increase residents' spatial deprivation, as shown by the fact that Mdantsane's population has declined in real terms.



In 1971, **Seshego (Polokwane)** was established as the interim capital of Lebowa (a self-governing state in line with apartheid policies) to channel urbanisation away from Pietersburg (now Polokwane). Seshego was further developed in terms of both Regulation 293 of 1962 and the regulations for the administration and control of townships of the Lebowa government. Compared to the other case studies, Seshego is much closer to its core urban area, only 10 km away from Polokwane. Post-apartheid, deliberate attempts were made to integrate planning and to develop the corridor between Seshego and Polokwane. Although the population growth rate declined in Seshego with the demise of apartheid, household income has grown substantially, suggesting functional and economic integration with Polokwane. The Seshego case study confirms the importance of being close to the urban core. This, combined with favourable topography, enabled the infill development between Seshego and Polokwane. As a result, what was once a dormitory town became a functional neighbourhood and a good example of urban integration in post-apartheid South Africa.

**Winterveld (Tshwane)** was established as a farming area for black farmers in the mid-1930s. In 1977 it officially became part of the 'independent' Republic of Bophuthatswana. As apartheid policies resulted in the forced removal of black people from Atteridgeville, Saulsville and Mamelodi and their resettlement north of Pretoria, Winterveld became a fast-growing squatter settlement. In 2001, Winterveld was integrated with the Tshwane Metropolitan Municipality and declared a Special Presidential Lead Project. Significant infrastructure investments followed, including the construction of new houses and the upgrading of schools. A number of agricultural initiatives were also introduced, with the aim of promoting rural development in the area. The jury is still out on whether the post-apartheid investments will prove to be sustainable in the long run. While the investments in Winterveld represent an example of good intergovernmental cooperation, the long-term cost of sprawling urban infrastructure is not known, and it is unclear whether Winterveld is an urban or rural settlement.

## COMMON ATTRIBUTES OF THESE SETTLEMENTS

The four case studies revealed that care should be taken not to generalise about these displaced settlements or hidden urbanities. The contexts are different, with (for example) Seshego, and to a lesser degree Mdantsane, integrated, whereas Botshabelo and Winterveld are not. However, the four settlements do share some common attributes:

- **Substantial government investment in basic infrastructure** (water, sanitation and electricity) since the demise of apartheid.
- **Amalgamation with urban core**, with the aim of creating integrated functional economic regions and planning systems, and distributing resources and institutional capacity to the displaced settlements. Only one case study – Seshego – achieved some spatial integration with its core economic area.
- **Spatial targeting for industrial development is part of the settlements' history**, which meant that very few of the industries survived the withdrawal of government subsidies after the end of apartheid. The post-apartheid investment in these areas is another form of spatial targeting and, in the absence of key economic drivers, may prove to be unsustainable in the long term.
- **Population growth has been slower than that of their respective municipalities.** Mdantsane's population declined in real terms between 2001 and 2011. The advantage has been

fewer informal settlements developing compared to the municipal areas. All four areas have seen a considerable decrease in the percentage of those younger than 35 years old, while the percentage of the population older than 60 years old has increased.

- **Economic growth was higher in the host municipal areas than in the four settlements.** The exception was between 2008 and 2011, i.e. just after the global financial crisis, when Botshabelo (1.20%), Seshego (2.68%) and Mdantsane (2.97%) experienced higher annual growth rates than Mangaung (0.36%), Polokwane (2.02%) and Buffalo City (2.79%). This is probably because the settlements were less directly dependent on the finance sector.
- **Significant retail investments in three of the four areas** (excluding Winterveld), but there is little evidence to suggest that these retail developments promote other economic activity in the area.
- **Residents are generally poorer than residents in former black townships** near the economic core areas, but better off than their rural counterparts. The human development index figures are generally lower and household expenditure on food is consistently higher in the displaced settlements compared to the black population in the core economic areas.
- **Expenditure on public transport is significantly higher** for households in the settlements than in the municipalities.
- **Quality of schools played a crucial role in creating (or not) a sense of place** in at least two of the case studies. In Winterveld, considerable investment in the school system served to attract learners to schools in the area, whereas in Botshabelo the outflow of people resulted in the closure of at least three schools.

## LESSONS FOR PROGRAMMES AND POLICY

1. **Displaced settlements have multiple functional roles.** These need to be understood, contextualised and incorporated into local planning frameworks, even if the economic potential of these areas is limited. A more nuanced understanding of places can lead to more appropriate and strategic investments that begin to work towards the vision of a post-apartheid, spatially transformed city.
2. **The quest for spatial integration and improved densities continues.** Innovative ways are needed to increase densities and achieve spatial integration within the regional context. This will require planning explicitly for spatial integration between the displaced settlements and their respective municipality.
3. **Large-scale infrastructure investments have locked people in.** The remarkable achievements in delivering basic services suggest spatial justice has been pursued at a basic level, but other principles such as spatial efficiency and quality appear not to have been accomplished. Therefore, the question is whether it is appropriate to continue with large-scale infrastructure investments in these areas.
4. **An open debate on transport and housing subsidies is needed.** An open debate on subsidisation is needed, including the rationale for using a bus subsidy and a settlement grant in the same place, and how this may effectively lock in locational inefficiencies.
5. **Tension between service delivery and spatial planning.** Local integrated and strategic planning is needed. The danger is that extending service delivery may in fact reinforce existing spatial inequalities. Different subsidies need to be reconciled and questions asked about the long-term viability of these settlements.

# PART 1: INTRODUCTION

This report builds on work previously done on differentiation in response to a commission from the SA Cities Network (SACN). The earlier reports argued that intermediate cities generally require differentiated approaches to planning, finance and institutional development. The present report on apartheid's displaced settlements discusses

- the need for a more nuanced articulation of differentiation;
- the need for outcomes-based perspectives on spatial policies;
- the need for truly informed future spatial strategies;
- the need for a recognition of differentiated outcomes and their causes; and
- a realisation that there is a dearth of research on settlements of this kind.

Further reflection is required in connection with displaced settlements because:

- They appear to be a differentiated spatial subcategory within the municipalities in which they are located.
- Their histories suggest some unique characteristics.
- They have policy/planning experiences and implications that will need to be clearly understood.

This introductory section deals with the history of these settlements (the post-apartheid spatial planning policy frameworks). It scrutinises existing research on displaced settlements (including policy implications), furnishes a more detailed justification for the study and describes research methods. The second part of the report briefly describes the four case studies and lays the foundation for identifying themes that are subsequently examined in the third part. The final section deals with key policy considerations. The full case studies are available on the SA Cities website [www.sacities.net](http://www.sacities.net)

## BACKGROUND

Apartheid planning left South Africa with a distinctive spatial legacy. Influx control, forced removals and channelled urbanisation were instrumental in preventing blacks from moving into the urban centres (Platzky and Walker, 1985). Homeland towns were created (Bekker, 1991), with the aim of redirecting black urbanisation away from the country's main urban centres to towns and settlements behind homeland boundaries. Yet these settlements had to be located close to core urban areas in order to be able to make use of black labour. Within this context, R293 towns were created under Proclamation 293 of 1962, which suggested that these towns were to be developed jointly by the Department of Development Aid and the homeland authorities (Bekker, 1991).

However, not all R293 towns were initially part of the homelands, and their inclusion had to be negotiated with the governments of the various Bantustans. These displaced settlements were distinctly different from the historically black townships. They were usually created in a homeland/self-governing territory and were further away from the main urban centres. In some cases, they were extensions (or performed the function) of a black township within the apartheid planning framework.

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### Terminology used in the report

**R293 towns:** Proclamation R293 of 1962 allowed the South African government to manage these towns located in former homeland areas. As at the time the towns were managed by South African government departments, local revenues were limited and local decision-making was absent.

**Displaced settlements:** R293 towns are commonly referred to as displaced settlements. Unlike black townships, these settlements were generally further away from the core urban areas. In many cases, a subsidised bus system had to be created to make allowance for long-distance commuting to and from these displaced settlements

**Hidden urbanities:** A name commonly given to displaced settlements to signify that the apartheid government had tried to hide the urbanisation of black people behind homeland boundaries, thereby keeping those people rural

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Attempts were made to increase the overall viability of these settlements, by offering incentives such as foundation grants, labour grants, power and transport subsidies and tax holidays (Christopher, 1994). Subsidised commuter systems were introduced to transport workers between their places of residence and work. Thus, '[L]ong distance commuting on a daily basis became a significant aspect of Black urban life as an increasing number of workers were forced to live in these homelands' (Christopher, 1994: 88). To stimulate economic development, the apartheid government offered decentralisation subsidies and developed growth points that created job opportunities in these homeland towns or in border industries.





However, 'in a number of cases, sites were only indicated vaguely on a map in order to provide each of the homelands with at least one decentralization point for political rather than economic reasons' (Christopher, 1994: 91). Attempts were also made to entice investors from South-East Asia, attracting large numbers of Taiwanese entrepreneurs.

In 1985, influx control was abolished and replaced by a policy of orderly urbanisation. In theory, the repeal of influx control ended channelled urbanisation but, in practice, the policy of orderly urbanisation meant that the free flow of people was not possible (Harrison, 1992). Only in the early 1990s – when large-scale land invasions by the poor (Wolfson, 1991) made a mockery of orderly urbanisation – did some degree of 'normalisation' start to influence urbanisation patterns.

Some examples of approximately 20 R293 towns are:

- Winterveld, Mabopane and Ga-Rankuwa, currently linked to the Tshwane Metropolitan Municipality<sup>1</sup>
- Botshabelo, currently linked to the Mangaung Metropolitan Municipality
- Seshego in Polokwane
- Pietermaritzburg, Edendale and Vulindlela
- Queenstown and Wittlesea
- King William's Town and Zwelitsha, Dimbaza
- East London and Mdantsane (Buffalo City)
- Durban (much of the historical urbanisation was to homeland areas adjacent to Durban)
- Bushbuckridge
- Siyabuswa, linked to Tshwane
- Mondlo, linked to Vryheid
- Loskop, linked to Estcourt
- Grahamstown and Glenmore.

This report considers four case studies selected from the above list: Botshabelo (Mangaung), Mdantsane (Buffalo City), Seshego (Polokwane) and Winterveld (Tshwane). In conducting the case studies, three overarching questions were asked:

- How have the socioeconomic profiles of the various displaced settlements changed over the past two to three decades, and what drove these changes?
- How have local, provincial and national government policies positively/negatively affected these displaced settlements?
- What is the main direction (and the drivers) of change in these displaced settlements?

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1. Note: Winterveld performed similar functions but was never managed in terms of proclamation R293.

## EXISTING RESEARCH

Academic reflection on displaced settlements remains limited, looking mostly at the impact of subsidies and the characteristics of these urban spaces.

At the time of the Reconstruction and Development Programme, the focus was exclusively on racial inequalities and failed to contextualise spatial inequalities (Crankshaw and Parnell, 1996). Scholars asked whether 'it is enough for the new government to simply try to improve the housing conditions of these disadvantaged groups when their poverty is caused by their lack of access to urban jobs?' (Crankshaw and Parnell, 1996: 54). Furthermore, the housing subsidy was available to households irrespective of their location, and subsidies to rural districts would reinforce the apartheid patterns of urbanisation.

The residents of these displaced urban settlements all qualify for state housing subsidies which will enable them to purchase formal homes or upgrade their existing accommodation. But is this in their best long-term interests? The problem with these displaced settlements is that they are unlikely ever to become anything but dormitory towns. Although the policy of servicing these settlements with water and providing formal housing may provide short-term employment in construction, it offers no long-term work opportunities. (Crankshaw and Parnell, 1996: 57)

Nearly two decades later, Parnell and Crankshaw (2013: 55) found that 'despite a considerable amount of lip service to urban reconstruction, policy directions to address the spatial legacies in South Africa (both within cities and between different areas) were mostly vague and difficult to implement'.

Other policy considerations were the continuation/discontinuation of transport (bus) subsidies and the infrastructure levels to be applied in these areas (Tomlinson and Krige, 1997). In this regard, the Centre for Development and Enterprise (CDE) argued that, although public investment in many of these displaced urbanities had increased, private-sector investments had declined considerably (CDE, 1998).

The majority of these settlements had slow or low population growth, although the population in some areas had grown (CDE, 1998) – e.g. the low and slow population growth in Botshabelo (Krige, 1996; Tomlinson and Krige, 1997). A number of studies have reflected on the changing characteristics of the people living in these settlements. The CDE (1998) study came to the following conclusions:

- While large percentages of people living in these settlements indicated that they would leave such areas, equally large percentages indicated that they did not intend moving.
- Conversely, other people had moved into these areas.
- Although people in these settlements were better off than their rural counterparts, they were worse off than people living in the main urban areas.
- High levels of dependency existed (for example on old-age pensions).
- The average monthly travelling costs of the people living in these settlements were nearly 75% higher than those of black workers in South Africa as a whole.

Of the roughly 40% of people who indicated they would leave, half were planning to move and the other half would move if they could find employment elsewhere. For others, the main reason for not moving was because they owned their houses, and '[f]or poor people, these are very significant assets' (CDE, 1998:12). In effect, this meant that they were stuck.

Unemployment figures in the displaced settlements were found to be similar to those in rural areas and higher than those in urban areas, while household incomes were slightly lower (by 10–20%) than in main urban centres but higher than in rural areas. (CDE, 1998).

Enterprises that had settled in these specific areas relocated/disinvested to other areas following the discontinuation of the apartheid government's subsidies (Nel and Hill, 2001). The situation in Botshabelo was somewhat different. Occupancy of industrial stands in Botshabelo was nearly 90% in 2004 (Marais et al., 2005) but had dropped to around 80% by 2013 (Marais et al., 2014). This occupancy figure is likely to decline further, as overall employment in these industries also declined.

## JUSTIFICATION FOR THIS STUDY

Several factors justify renewed reflection on displaced urban settlements:

**Need for finer spatial articulation and differentiation:** South Africa's larger cities are commonly labelled as areas of considerable population and economic growth, as highlighted in the Integrated Urban Development Framework (IUDF) (COGTA, 2016). However, this growth is fairly uneven within the respective urban areas. The case studies suggest either negative or slow population growth in most of these historically displaced settlements. Yet slow or low population growth is seldom contextualised in literature on urban planning frameworks in respect of the larger urban areas in South Africa.

**Limited research on displaced settlements:** The overall body of research into these areas remains small. While Parnell and Crankshaw (2013) have remarked that the 'where' of development is pivotal in South Africa, the amount of research remains limited.

**Informing future spatial strategies:** There is a renewed emphasis on 'spatial targeting' in South Africa. Although the concept is probably seen in a much broader context, a large part of the historical planning around displaced settlements was linked to spatial targeting. Yet any renewed emphasis on spatial targeting (which might or might not include some of these displaced settlements) requires a full understanding of the economies of the areas in question.

**An outcomes-based perspective on spatial policies:**

The policy responses have generally been fairly sterile and, in essence, inconsistent. For example, industrial subsidies were phased out and industries consequently closed down, but national government retained the long-distance commuting subsidy implemented under the apartheid regime. Furthermore, households in these areas could receive housing subsidies, which meant the post-apartheid enabled long-term assets to be generated in such areas. There is generally very little evidence of a systematic and integrated policy response that accounts for the various subsidies.

**Recognising differentiated outcomes and their causes:**

As mentioned, these areas are not all similar. Although the history has largely been the same, the outcomes have been different, more than 20 years after the demise of structured apartheid. In this respect, key questions to be asked about why this is the case and what the key drivers of change have been since 1994.



## METHODOLOGY

Four case studies (Botshabelo, Mdantsane, Seshego and Winterveld) were selected in order to obtain geographical spread. Each case study is located in a different province, but no case study from KwaZulu-Natal was included because of budgetary constraints. For each case study, the literature review covered existing academic research, local planning documents, a media search, and analysis of available data from Global Insight and Stats SA. Although the primary aim was to identify trends, these settlements were also compared with the historically black townships of the main urban areas. This was not possible for Seshego, which was both a homeland town and the former black township of Pietersburg (now Polokwane). In addition, in-depth interviews were held with 15 key informants in the respective areas, including officials from the respective municipalities (except for Tshwane), current councillors, teachers, community leaders and members of community-based organisations.

## DEFINING KEY TERMS

The term 'displaced settlements' is used in the discussion of the four case studies. These settlements are inherently different from the 'black township' areas created under apartheid, mainly because most of them are further from the economic core areas. The various geographical terms are used to compare the case studies are explained in Table 1.



**Table 1:** Geographical terms used for comparing the case studies

ATTRIBUTE	BOTSHABELO	MDANTSANE	SESHEGO	WINTERVELD <sup>2</sup>
Main case study area	Mainly the urban settlement of Botshabelo; lately, a small rural population has also developed (less than 2%)	The urban settlements of Mdantsane	The urban settlement of Seshego	The historical rural settlement in Winterveld, the informal settlements under apartheid and the newly established township areas
Core economic area	Bloemfontein	East London	Polokwane City	Pretoria
Former black township of core economic area	Mangaung township	Duncan Village	None	Atteridgeville, Saulsville and Mamelodi
Municipality	Mangaung	Buffalo City	Polokwane	Tshwane
Black population of urban core	Refers to the black population in the magisterial district of Bloemfontein	Refers to the black population in the magisterial district of East London	Refers to the black population of the magisterial district of Pietersburg	Refers to the black population in Atteridgeville, Saulsville, Mamelodi and the magisterial district of Pretoria

## LIMITATIONS OF THE STUDY

The study is essentially an exploration, intended to raise key questions and voice concerns, not to develop ‘grand’ findings and specific recommendations for these displaced settlements. The case studies represent just four of the former R293 towns, and their realities probably differ from some of the other R293 towns. Three of the four case studies were selected because of their functional location in relation to existing metropolitan areas, while the fourth case study was chosen because of its linkages with one of South Africa’s secondary cities.

## POST-APARTHEID SPATIAL PLANNING FRAMEWORKS

Spatial integration is a common theme that runs through post-apartheid spatial planning policy frameworks. Integration is needed because apartheid planning created spatial divides, fragmented planning frameworks and low-density urban development. While post-apartheid policy frameworks emphasise spatial integration and higher densities, achieving this in practice has not been easy. Ambiguity has characterised the application of some of the basic principles, which are not uniformly understood and, in some cases, simply ignored.

2. The overall emphasis in this section is on Winterveld. As some of the data is not available for Winterveld, the data for the greater Ga-Rankuwa Magisterial District – which includes Mabopane and Shoshanguve – is used

This reflection on the post-apartheid spatial planning policy frameworks is not intended to be a comprehensive commentary but to highlight how applying these powerful and important principles may be contradictory in different contexts, and may therefore need to be considered in contextualised and holistic manners, rather than on an ad hoc basis. For example, the principle of spatial justice is evident through the considerable effort put into upgrading basic infrastructure, but the principle of spatial efficiency is not adhered to, as the large investments in the four case studies did not assist urban integration and bring people closer to employment opportunities. Furthermore, while policy emphasises densification, few cities have recorded large increases in densities, apart from Johannesburg (from a low basis). Indeed, Turok (2011) argues that the government’s appetite for increasing densities has been limited, despite the policy rhetoric.

### THE DEVELOPMENT FACILITATION ACT (NO. 107 OF 1995)

The Development Facilitation Act (DFA) was promulgated as a mechanism to increase land release and, at the same time, to ensure a larger degree of urban integration. In 2010, parts of the Act were declared unconstitutional and the Spatial Planning and Land-Use Management Act (SPLUMA) repealed the remaining sections of the Act. Section 3 of Chapter 1 sets out the principles related to land development, which include:

- To promote integrated land development in rural and urban areas in support of each other.
- To promote the availability of residential and employment opportunities in close proximity to or integrated with each other.
- To discourage the phenomenon of ‘urban sprawl’ in urban areas and contribute to the development of more compact towns and cities.
- To correct the historically distorted spatial patterns of settlement and to use existing infrastructure optimally.
- To promote the establishment of viable communities.
- To meet the basic needs of all citizens in an *affordable* way [own emphasis added].



The key intentions of initial policy approaches in the democratic period were to increase densities and to counter urban sprawl in order to deal with the spatial legacy of apartheid planning.

### THE URBAN DEVELOPMENT FRAMEWORK (1997)

The Urban Development Framework (UDF) envisaged South Africa's desired urban future. However, the UDF was never formally adopted as a government policy and at best remained a framework that had to guide post-apartheid spatial planning. By 2020, cities and towns will:

- Be spatially and socioeconomically integrated; free from racial and gender discrimination and segregation;
- Be centres of economic and social opportunities where people can live and work in safety and in peace;
- Be characterised by good housing, infrastructure and effective services for households and for business, as the basis for an equitable standard of living;
- Integrate industrial, commercial, residential, information and education centres, thereby providing easy access to a range of urban resources;
- Be financed via government subsidies and mobilising additional resources through partnerships, capital markets and off-budget methods.

The UDF suggested five key programmes: (1) integrating the city, with the aim of doing away with apartheid-induced segregation, fragmentation and inequality; (2) improving housing and infrastructure; (3) building habitable and safe communities; (4) promoting urban economic development; and (5) creating institutions for delivery.

### THE NATIONAL SPATIAL DEVELOPMENT PERSPECTIVE (2003)

The National Spatial Development Perspective (NSDP) was an attempt to develop a countrywide approach to investment. The NSDP proposes that substantial capital and infrastructure should occur in large urban agglomerations, where most economic growth and more poor people (in real numbers) are found. Investments in peripheral areas should concentrate on skills development (education) that will enable poor people to contribute to the urban economy should they migrate at some stage of their life cycle. These ideas gained only limited acceptance in government circles, which explains why the NSDP was labelled a perspective and not a policy or a policy framework.

### THE NATIONAL DEVELOPMENT PLAN

Chapter Eight of the National Development Plan (NDP) considers the urban settlement system and states, '[w]here people live and work matters. Apartheid planning consigned the majority of South Africans to places far away from work, where services could not be sustained, and where it was difficult to access the benefits of society and participate in the economy' (NPC, 2012: 260). The NDP proposes five principles of spatial planning (NPC, 2012: 277):

- Spatial justice. The historical policy of confining particular groups to limited space (i.e. ghettoisation and segregation) and the unfair allocation of public resources between areas must be reversed so that the needs of the poor are addressed first rather than last.

- Spatial sustainability. Sustainable consumption and production patterns should be supported, and ways of living promoted that do not damage the natural environment.
- Spatial resilience. Vulnerability to environmental degradation, resource scarcity and climatic shocks must be reduced. Ecological systems should be protected and replenished.
- Spatial quality. The aesthetic and functional features of housing and the built environment need to be improved to create liveable, vibrant and valued places that allow for access and inclusion of people with disabilities.
- Spatial efficiency. Productive activity and jobs should be supported, and burdens on business minimised. Efficient commuting patterns and circulation of goods and services should be encouraged, with regulatory procedures that do not impose unnecessary costs on development.

The NDP also emphasises strategic spatial decision-making and calls for a review of existing housing-subsidy finance instruments in order to ensure that 'state funding does not support the further provision of non-strategic housing investments in poorly located areas' (NPC, 2012: 287).

### THE SPATIAL PLANNING AND LAND USE MANAGEMENT ACT (NO. 16 OF 2013)

The Spatial Planning and Land Use Management Act (SPLUMA) was ratified in 2013. Its main objectives are:

- To provide a uniform and coherent framework for spatial planning and land-use management.
- To specify the relationship between the spatial planning and the land-use management system.
- To provide for inclusive, developmental, equitable and efficient spatial planning in the different spheres of government.
- To address the legacy of past spatial planning and regulatory imbalances.
- To promote greater efficiency, consistency and uniformity in decision-making by the authorities responsible for land-development decisions.

On the whole, SPLUMA attempts to bridge the gap between land-use planning and spatial planning, and envisages wall-to-wall land-use schemes. It promotes the development principles of:

- Spatial justice, with reference to the inclusion of rural areas, informal settlements and areas in former homelands.
- Spatial sustainability, suggesting (i) that land development should 'consider all current and future costs to all parties for the provision of infrastructure and social services in land developments'; (ii) the aim is to 'promote land developments in locations that are sustainable' and (iii) to 'limit urban sprawl' – note the emphasis on viable communities and the intent to minimise urban sprawl.
- Spatial efficiency, emphasising the importance of optimally using infrastructure and resources and cautioning that decisions should minimise negative social, economic or environmental impacts.
- Spatial resilience, referring to the ability to deal with economic and social shocks.

SPLUMA is more technocratic than DFA and the UDF. Although this shift of approach should most likely be viewed in a positive light, it probably underemphasises some of the main principles in both the DFA and the UDF.



## THE INTEGRATED URBAN DEVELOPMENT FRAMEWORK (2016)

The IUDF was ratified in 2016 and states that the apartheid spatial legacy is 'one of sprawl, low densities, functional segregation between home and work, and overlapping racial and class separations' (COGTA, 2015: 15) and is still present. As a result, the country's cities and towns are highly inefficient and wasteful of scarce resources (especially land and infrastructure networks). Continuous urbanisation and considerable economic growth in some of the core economic areas add to the problems. The IUDF also acknowledges the importance of urban-rural linkages, and the need to reduce climate change and disaster risks, and to improve urban safety.

The IUDF's vision is '[l]iveable, safe, resource-efficient cities and towns that are socially integrated, economically inclusive and globally competitive, where residents actively participate in urban life' (COGTA, 2016: 38). Eight policy levers are proposed to achieve the four strategic goals of access, growth, governance and spatial transformation:

- Integrated spatial planning
- Integrated transport and mobility
- Integrated sustainable human settlements
- Integrated urban infrastructure
- Efficient land governance and management
- Inclusive economic growth
- Empowered active communities
- Effective urban governance.

The IUDF also calls for a national debate on transport subsidisation.



## PART 2: OVERVIEW OF THE CASE STUDIES



For each case study, an explanation is given of why the settlement was developed, followed by the changes that occurred after the repeal of influx control in 1985 and the challenging of the 'orderly urbanisation' policy after 1990. The post-apartheid intent is then examined, supported by reflections from community members, and concluding with some final thoughts or considerations.

## CASE 1


# BOTSHABELO

## PLACE OF REFUGEES

### ORIGINAL INTENT

To divert black urbanisation from Mangaung (Bloemfontein's historically black township), Botshabelo was created in 1979 on a site approximately 55 km east of the town (Figure 1). With the independence of Bophuthatswana in 1979, the Sesotho-speaking population was no longer welcome in Thaba Nchu (because the latter was a Tswana enclave), where they had been moved from Bloemfontein after 1968 (Krige, 1991). They therefore became the first residents of Botshabelo and were joined by a second group of Sesotho-speaking people from Sterkspruit, which had become a Xhosa enclave (Krige, 1996). Thereafter, black urbanisation that would normally have occurred in Bloemfontein continued to be redirected to Botshabelo. As a result, Botshabelo's population grew from about 60 000 in 1979 to 175 000 in 1991 (Krige, 1996) and 180 000 in 2011.

**Figure 1:** Location of Botshabelo in Mangaung





Various mechanisms were put in place to maintain this form of channelled urbanisation to Botshabelo:

- By 1980, a subsidised bus system was introduced to transport commuters the 55 km between Botshabelo and Bloemfontein.
- In 1982, the area was declared an industrial development point, which paved the way for large-scale industrial subsidies (Krige, 1991). Despite these subsidies, workers received meagre wages (Cobbet, 1987). Female employees working in the textile manufacturing industry constituted the largest percentage of workers.
- In the mid-1980s, a border industry, Bloemindustria, was established halfway between Bloemfontein and Botshabelo.

The apartheid state also attempted to include Botshabelo in the self-governing Qwaqwa homeland, but the Botshabelo community successfully went to court to prevent this move (Twala and Barnard, 2006).

## CHANGING TRENDS

### *Employment*

Between 1996 and 2013, jobs in Botshabelo's manufacturing industry declined from nearly 7 000 to a mere 1 000, while manufacturing's share of employment creation fell from nearly 24% to 5.7%. Following the 2009 recession, occupancy of manufacturing premises declined to 80% in 2013 (Marais, et al., 2014).

Over the past 20 years, the numbers of daily commuters have also decreased substantially. The community services sector accounts for approximately 35% of all employees, suggesting an increased dependency on government services for new jobs in Botshabelo.

### *Population*

While the population in Bloemfontein has grown substantially since 1991, the Botshabelo population has experienced low or slow growth, currently standing at 183 000 (2011) – up from 175 000 in 1991 – and is ageing. According to a local councillor when asked what they would do if they won the lottery, 'young and old people ... would tell me one thing: they will immediately leave Botshabelo'.



*'young and old people  
... would tell me one  
thing: they will  
immediately leave  
Botshabelo'*



### *Informal settlements/land invasions*

Mangaung, Bloemfontein's former black township area, has experienced large-scale development of informal settlements and increased land invasions, which coincided with the settling in the area of many former Botshabelo residents (Marais and Ntema, 2013). Some informal settlements have also developed in Botshabelo, but on a considerably smaller scale compared to Bloemfontein (Mokoena and Marais, 2008).

## POST-APARTHEID INTENT

From within Botshabelo, there was (and still is) continued pressure to have the area declared a 'special urban development node', similar to the Alexandra Township urban renewal programme in Johannesburg. To this end, the Botshabelo Investment Study was commissioned in 1995/96, with a view to developing an appropriate investment plan. The resultant report suggested careful investment in basic services (though not beyond basic levels), but apparently received a rather lukewarm response from the authorities (Tomlinson and Krige, 1997).

In 2001, Botshabelo was amalgamated with Bloemfontein and Thaba Nchu to form the Mangaung Local Municipality (which in 2011 became the Mangaung Metropolitan Municipality). This created both the fiscal base and the institutional capacity for large-scale investment in basic infrastructure in Botshabelo. Many of these investments have probably exceeded the original expectations of the Botshabelo Investment Study. Since 2001, the number of households with water-borne sanitation, water on the stand, electricity and refuse removal has increased considerably. Investment in housing has also increased, with improvements to the size of houses and to formal housing units, and a new trading mall is being developed.

## COMMUNITY REFLECTIONS

*Botshabelo played an important role in addressing urbanisation (i.e. finding a place to stay other than on a commercial farm), even if it was in the wrong location. For many residents, Botshabelo represented freedom. As one of the residents said, 'We worked and stayed at a farm and the relationship between us and our employers was not always great and so we wanted to make sure that if they ever chase us away we would have our own place to stay.'*

*Many people are prevented from moving because of the assets that they have generated over the past 30 years. As a middle-income earner in Botshabelo explained,*

I would have also loved to move to Bloemfontein especially now that I am closer to retiring and my children attend tertiary education in Bloemfontein but I will not be able to as this means I have to sell this house and get another one there. Selling this house would not be profitable enough to afford me the same type of house in Bloemfontein.

Perceived poor quality education and health services mean that many children from Botshabelo attend school elsewhere (in Bloemfontein, Thaba Nchu and Tweespruit), while some schools in the south of Botshabelo have been closed because of declining numbers.

## KEY CONSIDERATIONS

The Botshabelo case study reflects one of South Africa's appalling creations under apartheid: the inhumane and inefficient system of channelling workers to live in places far from their places of employment. The inefficient location of Botshabelo 55 km east of Bloemfontein (ironically, with settlement densities exceeding those of Bloemfontein by 10:1) placed pressures on households and government to ensure access to employment.

Amalgamating Botshabelo with Bloemfontein to form one local government structure led to considerable investment in local services and the provision of some housing subsidies. Improved basic services seem to have contributed to extensive investment in housing, but the bus subsidy remains intact because the dislocation has been difficult to fundamentally address, and attempts to create local economies through industrial schemes failed. Under these circumstances, the question becomes whether investments in basic services and the continued bus subsidy have merely served to reinforce the spatial deprivation created under apartheid.



## CASE 2


## MDANTSANE

## THE APARTHEID 'PARADISE'

 ORIGINAL INTENT

In 1959, Mdantsane was created about 20 km from East London (now Buffalo City) and halfway to King William's Town, to channel urbanisation from Duncan Village (East London's original black township since 1950) to behind the Ciskei border (Figure 2). The unsatisfactory living conditions in Duncan Village enabled the apartheid regime to use the 'sanitary syndrome'<sup>3</sup> excuse to relocate the black population. Although not initially established as a R293 town, Mdantsane was managed in terms of Regulation R293, which was promulgated in 1962.

**Figure 2:** Location of Mdantsane in Buffalo City



3. Apartheid planning often used unsatisfactory or lack of adequate sanitary facilities to justify relocation, displacement and segregation.



Mdantsane grew at a tremendous pace after 1961, when the first residents moved into the settlement. The available employment opportunities were strong magnets for attracting people: the Regional Industrial Decentralisation Programme (introduced in 1962) led to the establishment of border industries (for example, in Wilsonia) and industries in Mdantsane (Fort Jackson) after 1979. Most of the jobs were in the textile industry, which received high subsidises but paid women very low wages (Nel, 1990). A subsidised bus system was introduced to facilitate commuting between East London and Mdantsane but did not last long because of bus boycotts in the late 1970s; it was replaced by a non-subsidised taxi system.

Although the apartheid state propaganda described Mdantsane as a model town that boasted a diversity of amenities, the relocation meant that much of the community spirit and social cohesion characteristic of Duncan Village (known to some residents as Tsolo) was eroded. One respondent captured the impact of the relocation:

When I was in Tsolo there were [a] lot of activities that used to keep the youth busy. These included playing cricket and rugby in township schools; going to Victory cinema; watching karate and boxing; accompanying our parents to town and, in turn, they would give us lift in their bicycles. This good life in Tsolo came to an end when the government made a ruling that the blacks in Tsolo should be relocated to the homeland in Mdantsane.

## CHANGING TRENDS

### *Employment*

By the end of the 1980s, nearly 30 000 job opportunities were available in Wilsonia and nearly 7 500 in Fort Jackson (Nel, 1990) but from the early 1990s employment declined following the withdrawal of decentralisation subsidies and the rise of labour unions. As such, the number of formally employed people in Mdantsane dropped from 40 000 in 1996 to just over 10 000 in 2013. Manufacturing saw the biggest decline of more than 10 000 jobs between 1996 and 2001. However, over the past 20 years, the expanding automotive industry in East London has largely absorbed the unemployment created by the decline of the local industrial base of Mdantsane.





### *Population*

Over the past 20 years, Mdantsane's population has declined in real terms, from approximately 195 000 in 1996 to approximately 165 000 in 2011. However, the number of households increased between 1996 and 2001. Interestingly, Duncan Village also lost people, while Buffalo City grew at a moderate pace. Mdantsane's population is ageing, with the percentages of people aged 15–34 years dropping from 39% in 1996, to 36% in 2011.



### POST-APARTHEID INTENT

In the mid-1990s, East London and Mdantsane were merged into one local government structure: the East London Transitional Local Council. Then in 2001, Buffalo City Municipality was created, comprising Buffalo City (East London), King William's Town, Bisho and the surrounding rural areas. Mdantsane – located between East London and King William's Town – started to perform the role of infilling and was declared an urban renewal node in 2001. However, the initial euphoria was short-lived because only limited funds were available. The European Union then agreed to fund a substantial portion of the development, but this folded upon the discovery that the municipality had not followed correct financial accounting procedures.

Nonetheless, access to water, sanitation and electricity has improved, although the levels of basic services in Mdantsane were already relatively high in 1996 (e.g. 76% of households had water on the stand). Access to electricity has risen from 46% in 1996 to nearly 80% in 2011. The automotive industry has also invested in the municipal area, while other private investors have contributed towards 'changing the face' of Mdantsane, by, for example, the establishment of the NU6 Mall.





## COMMUNITY REFLECTIONS

Although basic services seem to have improved in Mdantsane, school results are poor, and some schools have closed. Despite concerns about road accidents between Mdantsane and East London, many children attend schools in East London because, as a community member explained:

Sending our children to schools in East London is not only meant to enable them [to] access better quality education, but also to make sure that we equally enjoy the new democratic dispensation of racial integration. We want our kids to also learn in those schools previously reserved for whites, Indians and coloureds.

The quality of health and social infrastructure is also in decline (van Rensburg-Bonthuyzen, et al., 2003). One resident said that 'the municipalities are neglecting the sporting infrastructure and stadiums. The swimming pools, tennis courts, boxing houses are now down and defunct.' Overall, community perceptions about life in Mdantsane are negative, many people have already left the town and those that remain are increasingly dependent on government grants.



*'Sending our children to schools in East London is not only meant to enable them [to] access better quality education, but also to make sure that we equally enjoy the new democratic dispensation of racial integration.'*

## KEY CONSIDERATIONS

The issues facing Mdantsane are not very different from those in Botshabelo, with the exception of the transport subsidy. Despite a large-scale industrial exodus, significant public-sector investment in basic service delivery has occurred through urban renewal projects. However, planning documents do not acknowledge that nearly 30 000 people left Mdantsane between 1996 and 2011. As in the case of Botshabelo, the question of whether increased investment in basic services only serves to increase the spatial deprivation of residents is also relevant in Mdantsane.

# CASE 3


# SESHEGO

## FROM TOWNSHIP TO SUBURBIA

### ORIGINAL INTENT

To channel urbanisation away from Pietersburg (now Polokwane), Seshego was established in 1971 as the interim capital of Lebowa (a self-governing state in line with apartheid policies) and to locate black people who had been forcibly removed from Polokwane and from proclaimed white group areas (Donaldson, 2001). Seshego was further developed in terms of both Regulation 293 of 1962 and the regulations for the administration and control of townships of the Lebowa government. At only 10 km from Polokwane, Seshego is much closer to its core urban area than the other R293 towns covered in this report.

**Figure 3:** Location of Seshego in Polokwane





Seshego's close proximity to Polokwane meant that a subsidised bus service was never implemented. The small spatial divide and Seshego's functional role as Pietersburg's black township area probably contributed to the fact that Seshego today is relatively well integrated with Polokwane City.

## CHANGING TRENDS AND PROCESSES

### *Employment*

Between 1996 and 2013, Seshego shed jobs at an average annual rate of 0.9% (16.5% per year between 2011 and 2013), at a time when Polokwane had an annual growth rate of 7.3% (18.1% per year between 2011 and 2013). Manufacturing accounts for 8.1% of employment, down from 13.4% in 1996. Two sectors – community services (32.5%) and trade (24.5%) account for over half (57.1%) of the formal employment, compared to 40.7% in Polokwane.

### *Population*

With the demise of apartheid and the development of the corridor between Polokwane and Seshego, the population growth rate declined in Seshego. Between 2001 and 2011, Seshego's population grew by 0.4% annually, which was much lower than that of Polokwane (2.2%) and probably because of urban desegregation. In 2011, Seshego was home to 72 000 people, and 75 000 more people lived in the corridor between the Seshego and Polokwane City. Household income in Seshego has grown substantially, from being generally lower than the national average in 1996 to outstripping the national average by 2013. This suggests functional and economic integration.

## POST-APARTHEID INTENT

In 1993, Seshego and Pietersburg were integrated into the Pietersburg Transitional Local Council (later the Polokwane Local Municipality), but high levels of desegregation had already occurred since the repeal of the Group Areas Act (Kotze and Donaldson, 1996). Municipal integration paved the way for integrated planning, and deliberate attempts were also made to develop the corridor between Seshego and Pietersburg. Substantial infrastructure investments were made in Seshego, as well as along the corridor, contributing to the functional spatial and economic integration of Seshego with Polokwane. The Neighbourhood Development Partnership Grant and the envisaged Bus Rapid Transport System also played (and play) a part in the development and upgrading of services in Seshego.



## COMMUNITY REFLECTIONS

Community perceptions suggest that Seshego has largely developed as a suburb within Polokwane, and the quality of education and health services is not a serious concern: 'We see lots of rich people in Seshego now;

*'We see more shops and more businesses – people are making money'.*

there are people with nice houses and big cars. [...] 'We see more shops and more businesses – people are making money'. People appear to be less dependent on the state, with comments such as: 'In Seshego you make a job if you don't find a job' – sentiments that were not evident in the other case studies.



## KEY CONSIDERATIONS

The Seshego case study confirms the importance of being close to the urban core. This, combined with favourable topography, has enabled the infill development between Seshego and Polokwane. As a result, what was once a dormitory town became a functional neighbourhood and is probably a prime example of urban integration in post-apartheid South Africa.







## CASE 4

# WINTERVELD

## THE ONCE FORGOTTEN FOLK

### ORIGINAL INTENT

Winterveld became a sanctuary for homeless, unemployed Africans caught between rural landlessness and urban illegality (Horn, 1997: 113), or as a community member explained:<sup>4</sup>

You know I was there when the apartheid government came with trucks full of people from black spot removals and literally dumping them in the streets next to our plots ... because of Ubuntu, we could not just ignore our brothers and sisters who literally had nowhere to go, and we invited them to come and stay with us ... that is how this thing of tenants started in Winterveld.

For reasons of profitability, the demand for land gave rise to shack farming and to the subletting of land (Horn et al., 1992: 115). Yet despite cultural differences among the people of Winterveld, the area became 'living proof that residents of a multi-ethnic, diverse African community could coexist and live together' (de Clerq, 1994: 381).

In 1977, Winterveld officially became part of the 'independent' Republic of Bophuthatswana, but the Bophuthatswana government was reluctant to absorb non-Tswana residents into Bophuthatswana. Eventually, the South African and Bophuthatswana governments reached a compromise and an intergovernmental management committee was formed.<sup>5</sup> However, this committee became unpopular and to some extent sparked dissatisfaction and resistance among community members.

### CHANGING TRENDS AND PROCESSES

#### *Employment*


Employment in the manufacturing sector decreased from 30.5% in 1996 to 18.3% in 2013. However, considerable growth in the automotive sector in Rosslyn probably helped to soften the impact of jobs lost as a result of subsidies being phased out. Although unemployment remains stubbornly high, evidence indicates that some of the successful job-creation initiatives in Winterveld are those funded either solely by government or by government in partnership with individual small-scale farmers in the rural 10-morgen areas. Thus, while employment in more urban 5-morgen areas is predominantly in the informal urban economy such as motor mechanics, spaza shops, etc., the majority of the residents in the rural 10-morgen areas are mainly employed in agriculture-related economic activities such as poultry farming, citrus farming, etc.

4. Landlord Seven. 2014. Focus group discussion with plot owners in 5-Morgen, Winterveld.

5. *Pretoria News*. 1979. Determine status for Winterveld, 21 August 1979, p. 3; *Financial Mail*. 1979 Winterveld. People are living there, 20 April 1979, p. 207.



**Figure 4:** Location of Winterveld in Tshwane



**Note:**

- Mabopane and Ga-Rankuwa: areas in the former Bophuthatswana homeland that exclusively accommodated Tswana people who had been displaced from white South Africa.
- Soshanguve: formerly an extension and part of Mabopane, which was later reincorporated into white South Africa specifically to accommodate the Sotho, Shangaan, Nguni and Venda people displaced both from Mabopane and Ga-Rankuwa in Bophuthatswana, and from white Pretoria in South Africa.

*Education*

The community of Winterveld is very proud of its school infrastructure. Contrary to what some long-serving current school principals have referred to as ‘the past difficult times in the history of education in Winterveld schools when most Winterveld children were schooling in Mabopane and Soshanguve’, the latest official statistics (Gauteng DBE, 2014) indicate that the total number of schoolchildren in Winterveld has increased significantly from 16 081 in 2007 to 28 184 in 2014.





Further confirmation of both the improved standard of education and the significant increase in the numbers of schoolchildren has come from community interviews. In these interviews, schools in Winterveld were widely mentioned as alternatives not only to schools in Ga-Rankuwa, Soshanguve, Mabopane and to certain parts of the former white suburbs of Pretoria North, but also to schools in the Madibeng Local Municipality in the North West Province.

### *Population*

Between 1995 and 2011, Winterveld's population grew by 15 000, increasing from 122 551 to 137 436. After declining between 1996 and 2001, its annual average growth rate was 1.49% between 2001 and 2011. This growth rate was lower than for Tshwane as a whole and is possibly the result of the government's investment in infrastructure in Winterveld. The economically active population grew between 1996 and 2011,

with the 15–34 year age group increasing from 38.8%– 41% and the 35–59 year group increasing from 21.3%–23.6%. This could be because of the growing number of former residents of Winterveld returning home from Gauteng and surrounding areas.

## POST-APARTHEID INTENT

In 2001, Winterveld was integrated with the Tshwane Metropolitan Municipality and declared a Special Presidential Lead Project by national government.<sup>6</sup> This led to an urban renewal project managed by the provincial government.<sup>7,8</sup> The Tshwane Metropolitan Municipality did a cost assessment of upgrading the area, which resulted in several developments in Winterveld: approximately 12 000 new houses were constructed (and a further 18 000 envisaged) as part of the Housing Subsidy Programme; electricity access for lighting in Winterveld increased from 19.9% in 1996 to 81.1% in 2011; schools were upgraded and school feeding schemes were introduced. These infrastructural improvements have contributed to increasing population numbers in Winterveld but have also led to conflict between the original settlers (those on farmland) and the state over compensation for the land. A number of agricultural initiatives have been introduced, including an agricultural secondary school, with the aim of promoting rural development in the area.<sup>9</sup>

6. *Pretoria News*. 2004. Winterveld set to be upgraded, 22 July 2004, p. 5.

7. Bateman B. 2010. Blaming apartheid won't wash – Zuma. *Pretoria News*, 29 April 2010, p. 5.

8. Hlahla P. 2009. Project celebrates bumper orange harvest. *Pretoria News*, 13 July 2009, p. 5.

9. Hlahla, P. (2009, July 13). Project celebrates bumper orange harvest. *Pretoria News*, p. 5.; Mashala, P. (2011, June 10). Small-scale farmers establish agri school to save their community. *Farmers weekly*, p. 33.; Xaba, V. (2010, Nov 22). Project to fight hunger on track. *Sowetan*, p. 14.





## COMMUNITY REFLECTIONS

Residents in Winterveld have generally positive perceptions, despite the conflict between the original landowners and the Tshwane Metropolitan Municipality.

[I see] a rapid growth in the number of paved streets, electrified houses, new community centres and [a] whole lot of other infrastructural development which was never there before. I would always be of the view that Winterveld is getting its fair share if not more than other areas.

I think the City of Tshwane is treating us the same because we are now getting services such as street lights that in the past one could only find in Soshanguve [...] Yes, I think they are in the process of addressing the previous imbalances.

The considerable investment (including in schools) appears to be attracting people either to settle in or return to Winterveld, as one community member said, 'Despite being the once forgotten folk with existing challenges ... people are coming back home!'



## KEY CONSIDERATIONS

The jury is still out on whether the post-apartheid investments will prove sustainable in the long run. While the investments in Winterveld represent an example of good practice of intergovernmental cooperation, the long-term cost of having sprawling urban infrastructure is not known. There is also conflict on whether Winterveld is urban or rural, while substantial investments in schools have resulted in children being bused in to these schools on a daily basis.



## SUMMARY OF FINDINGS

The main findings for the four case studies are summarised in Table 2.

**Table 2:** A comparison of key attributes related to the four case studies

ATTRIBUTE	BOTSHABELO	MDANTSANE	SESHEGO	WINTERVELD
<b>GEOGRAPHY &amp; ADMINISTRATION</b>				
Date established	1979	1959	1971	1938 (first black ownership in the area)
R293 status	Yes	Yes – 1962	Yes	No, but Mabopane was managed in terms of this regulation
Homeland linked to	Intended to be part of self-governing Qwaqwa – never materialised	Ciskei (independent homeland)	Lebowa (self-governing)	Bophuthatswana (independent homeland)
Urban core linked to and distance from the core	Bloemfontein – 55km	East London – 29km	Polokwane (Pietersburg) – 10km	Pretoria – 50km
Former black township in urban core	Mangaung Township	Duncan Village	None	Atteridgeville, Mamelodi and Soshanguve
Current municipality	Mangaung	Buffalo City	Polokwane	Tshwane
Type of municipality	Metro	Metro	Local Municipality	Metro
<b>DEMOGRAPHICS</b>				
Population growth/decline	Slow growth	Decline	Growth	Growth
Population size 1996	176 000	195 165	57 699	122 551
Population size 2001	178 000	184 600	69 269	118 523
Population size 2011	183 000	164 681	72 182	137 436
Evidence of ageing population	Significant	Significant	Evident but not significantly more than in Polokwane	Evident but not significantly more than in Tshwane

ATTRIBUTE	BOTSHABELO	MDANTSANE	SESHEGO	WINTERVELD
<b>ECONOMY</b>				
Industrial development initiatives	Declared industrial development point in 1982; Bloemindustria developed as border industry	Fort Jackson created in the late 1970s. Wilsonia an example of a border industry	Went hand-in-hand with the industrialisation of Pietersburg – less dependent on state subsidies	The development of Rosslyn
Post-apartheid industrial trends	Decline in manufacturing employment; decline in firm occupancy; Bloemindustria never developed	Large decline in occupancy levels in Fort Jackson; yet growth in the automotive industry absorbed large numbers of people		Sharp decline in employment
Number of jobs lost in manufacturing between 1996 and 2013	5 758	1 077	2 134	81 589
% of original jobs in manufacturing lost	84.4	79.6	48.3	61.5
New growth sectors	Community services (government)	Community services (government)	Community services (government)	Community services (government)
Annual economic growth rate (1996 – 2013)	Slow, substantially slower than Mangaung; 1.6%	Average, substantially slower than Buffalo City; 2.0%	Average, substantially slower than Polokwane; 2.8%	Average, substantially slower than Tshwane; 2.4%
<b>TRANSPORTATION</b>				
Commuting systems	Subsidised bus system – considerable decline in the number of commuters	Originally bus system – later replaced by taxis	No formal bus system	Subsidised bus system – considerable decline in the number of commuters
Post-apartheid trends in bus system	Declining daily commuters; higher levels on Fridays / Mondays	Originally bus system – replaced in mid 1980s by taxis	Never had a bus system	Daily commuters considerably fewer than at the beginning of the 1990s
<b>SERVICES</b>				
Investment in basic services delivery post 1994	Very high – mainly funded through the Mangaung Metro since 2001	Intentions were to invest heavily – in practice probably only moderate investments	High – some investments done prior to 1996	Very high (national, provincial and local governments are involved)
Basic service levels	Substantial improvements	Substantial improvements	Moderate improvements as existing levels of infrastructure was fairly good	Substantial improvements

In conclusion, three main points must be made.

1. Despite initial expectations, developing policy prescriptions that would apply equally to all four settlements was not possible because of the different contexts. Therefore, care should be taken not to generalise about these settlements. Spatially, Seshego (and to a lesser degree Mdantsane) is integrated, whereas Botshabelo and Winterveld display very few characteristics of integration. The historically rural character of Winterveld also brings considerably different dynamics to the fore.
2. People settled in these towns for a number of different reasons. Therefore, care should be taken not to simplistically label any of these places with a singular theme or function. For example, while some people were channelled to Botshabelo away from Bloemfontein, other people considered Botshabelo as a functional home away from a commercial farm. In Winterveld, a significant percentage of people see themselves as part of the agricultural sector.
3. Any future policy response must acknowledge the reality that some people did not choose to reside in these settlements but were sent there as a result of the apartheid government's forced removal and displacement policies.





## PART 3: COMPARING THE CASES

Before identifying the key attributes of these settlements since the demise of apartheid, it is important to set the national context with regard to urbanisation and densification.

Post-apartheid, '[t]he loosening of controls was associated with the upscaling of urbanisation', with 'individuals and households in South Africa ... "voting with their feet" by moving into places which are better able to provide livelihoods' (Harrison and Todes, 2015: 153). This migration in pursuit of job opportunities has tended to be to the larger urban areas, with Gauteng dominating nationally. Johannesburg, Tshwane and Ekurhuleni accounted 'for 36.4% of the net increase in South Africa's population between 1996 and 2011, and 41.9% of the net increase in employed persons' (ibid). This suggests that migration is associated with finding employment, a trend confirmed by Turok and Borel-Saladin (2014) who found employment growth coincided with demographic trends.


For historical reasons, South African cities have low densities and, counter to the usual logic of global cities, densities increase as the distance from the centre increases (Turok, 2011). Although some places show increased densities in the core, urban sprawl has prevailed during the post-apartheid period (Harrison and Todes, 2015). In many cases '[t]he exclusionary spatial patterns inherited from the past continue to be reproduced, sometimes through the government's own investment decisions' (Turok, 2013). Any considerable spatial change is even more unlikely to occur during a period of low economic growth.



## GOVERNMENT INVESTMENT IN INFRASTRUCTURE

Since the demise of apartheid, government has invested heavily in basic infrastructure in all four case study areas. These improvements (in access to water, sanitation and electricity) are evident in Figure 5. The scale of this delivery record reflects the difficult legacy of 'backlogs' that the post-apartheid government was confronted with as an urgent political and social imperative.

**Figure 5:** Improvements in basic service levels in the four settlements (1996, 2001 and 2013)



*The percentages of households with access to water, sanitation and electricity have increased considerably in all four settlements*



The percentages of households with access to water, sanitation and electricity have increased considerably in all four settlements, most notably in Botshabelo and Winterveld. Between 1996 and 2013, households with water on the stand increased from 40% to 92.3% in Botshabelo and from 34.4% to 74.7% in Winterveld. Access to electricity has also improved in all four towns. Although substantial improvements in respect of waterborne sewerage are evident, the percentages are still relatively low (approximately 35%) in Botshabelo and Winterveld.

## MUNICIPAL AMALGAMATION AND SPATIAL TARGETING

Seshego/Pietersburg (Pietersburg Transitional Local Council) and Mdantsane/East London (East London Transitional Local Council) amalgamated during the 1990s and the period of transitional local councils, while Botshabelo/Bloemfontein (Mangaung) and Pretoria/Winterveld (Tshwane) were integrated when wall-to-wall municipalities were established in 2001.

Amalgamation was important for a number of reasons:

- Race-based planning and spatial development was replaced by integrated planning systems of previously fragmented spatial systems.
- Functional economic regions could be integrated for planning purposes.
- The institutional capacity available in the larger economic units could be used to serve the spatially deprived settlements.
- Resources were distributed to these displaced settlements.

Yet amalgamation did not necessarily result in the establishment of a strategic view on planning in these settlements. A primary focus on addressing infrastructural disparities outweighed all other considerations, which included the necessity of having to deal with the transport subsidy.

Spatial targeting for industrial development is part of the history of each of the four settlements. Very few of the initial industries in these settlements (or, for that matter, in the adjacent border industries) managed to survive once government had withdrawn state subsidies. Industries in Seshego/Polokwane, having been less dependent on subsidies, were on different growth trajectories than those of the industries in Botshabelo and Mdantsane, where the industrial areas experienced rapid decline. Though substantial losses in textile jobs occurred in Winterveld/Ga-Rankuwa and Mdantsane, the scale of the economy and overall growth in the automotive industry helped to minimise the negative effects.


The post-apartheid investment in these areas is another form of spatial targeting. The type of institutional arrangements may vary (from presidential investment nodes, urban renewal nodes to large-scale local government infrastructure investment), but the investments were made in the absence of evidenced key economic drivers and, like the industrial subsidies under apartheid rule, their long-term sustainability is questionable.



## POPULATION AND POPULATION GROWTH

Figure 6 compares the population growth rates of the settlements with the overall municipal growth rate for the period between 2001 and 2011.

**Figure 6:** Annual population growth rate (2001–2011)



Source: Global Insight (2014)

All four settlements have either seen a substantial drop in population or low population growth, especially compared to their respective municipalities. Between 2001 and 2011, Mdantsane's population declined in real terms, and the growth rates in Botshabelo, Seshego and Mdantsane were all below South Africa's natural population growth rate. Yet the number of households increased in all four settlements – this is also the case throughout South Africa. Winterveld's substantial population growth between 2001 and 2011 came after an outflow of people following the repeal of influx control and the demise of the orderly urbanisation policy (Winterveld is estimated to have lost approximately 50 000 people between the late 1980s and 1996). The population growth since 2001 is probably associated with the considerable investment in infrastructure, housing and schools.

The low/slow population growth stands in sharp contrast to the population growth rates experienced in the rest of the respective municipal areas. This slow population growth appears to have been a blessing in disguise, as fewer informal settlements were established compared to the municipal areas (this, of course, being an indicator of the better location of spaces in the core; i.e. informal settlements tend to locate closer to economic or other opportunities that dwellers seek). Therefore, investments made in the settlements dealt with the existing situation, not with additional growth.

*All four settlements have either seen a substantial drop in population or low population growth,*



*especially compared to their respective municipalities.*



Table 3 shows the population structure and different age categories for 1996 and 2011.

**Table 3:** Population share per age segment (1996 and 2011)

AGE	BOTSHABELO		MANGAUNG		MDANTSANE		BUFFALO CITY		SESHEGO		POLOKWANE		WINTERVELD		TSHWANE	
	1996 %	2011 %	1996 %	2011 %	1996 %	2011 %	1996 %	2011 %	1996 %	2011 %	1996 %	2011 %	1996 %	2011 %	1996 %	2011 %
0–14 years	35.8	31.6	29.7	26.8	32.1	24.9	33.7	29	33.7	29	30.4	26.4	33.7	29	27.2	23.2
15–34 years	38.9	37.5	39.5	36.3	41.3	42.8	39.4	41	39.4	41	37.6	36.2	39.4	41	39.7	40.6
35–60 years	19.4	23.6	24.7	27.9	21.6	25.7	21.6	23.6	21.6	23.6	24.5	28.6	21.6	23.6	26.4	28.7
60+ years	5.9	7.3	6.1	8.9	5	6.7	5.2	6.4	5.2	6.4	7.4	8.8	5.2	6.4	6.7	7.5

Source: Stats SA (2013)

The percentage of the population under the age of 35 has decreased considerably in all the case study areas, indicating that the working age population is leaving the settlements. While normal demographic change may account for some of this decrease, the scale suggests an outflow of younger working-class people from these areas. The outmigration of working-age people is higher in Mdantsane and Botshabelo than in Seshego or in Winterveld (where people appear to be returning or moving into the areas).


The share of population older than 60 has increased, and the average age has increased more rapidly than in their respective municipalities. The percentage of people older than 60 living in Mdantsane was 0.1% higher than in Buffalo City, which is surprising considering the older white population segment in Buffalo City. The percentage of people older than 60 in Botshabelo increased by 1.4% (from 5.9% in 1996 to 7.3% in 2011), compared to just 0.6% in Mangaung. The other settlements display a similar trend. Essentially, large increases in the percentages of aged populations mean that these settlements could increasingly be viewed as places where non-economically active populations live.



## ECONOMIC GROWTH

Figure 7 shows the economic growth in the case studies compared to their respective metropolitan/local municipal areas.

**Figure 7:** Annual economic growth rates (1996–2013)



Source: *Global Insight (2014)*

In all cases, economic growth was higher in the host municipal areas than in the four settlements. Seshego reported the highest (2.8%) and Botshabelo (1.6%) the lowest annual economic growth. However, during the period following the global financial crisis (2008–2011), annual growth rates in Botshabelo (1.20%), Seshego (2.68%) and Mdantsane (2.97%) were higher than in Mangaung (0.36%), Polokwane (2.02%) and Buffalo City (2.79%). This is probably because the settlements were less directly dependent on the finance sector.

The lower long-term economic growth rates – and lower population rates – in the four settlements are not necessarily surprising, as their peripheral location places them at a disadvantage compared to their respective municipalities.

In three of the four areas (excluding Winterveld), large national or multinational chain stores have, or are planning to, make significant retail investments. This trend has been driven by a continued search by retail establishments to find new locations for their outlets (SACN, 2009). These investments can also be linked to increased investment in the basic and bulk infrastructure associated with various forms of urban renewal projects (Harrison and Todes, 2015). Yet other private-sector investments have been rather limited. There is also little evidence to suggest that these retail developments promote other economic activity in the areas (SACN, 2009).

## POVERTY LEVELS


Residents in these displaced settlements were generally poorer than residents in former black townships near the economic core areas, but better off than their rural black counterparts. The three indicators used to measure poverty are: the human development index (HDI), the percentage/number of people living in poverty and the percentage of household expenditure spent on food.



## HUMAN DEVELOPMENT INDEX

The HDI is a compound indicator consisting of educational level, per capita income and life expectancy. The changing HDI for the four case studies is compared to the black population of the magisterial districts of Mangaung, East London, Polokwane and Pretoria, with the purpose of comparing the displaced population with the population that was able to migrate directly to the main urban complex (Figure 8).

**Figure 8:** Human development index (1996 and 2013)



Source: Global Insight (2014)


The 2013 HDI figures for the four case studies were consistently lower than those for the black population living in the core economic areas. Of the four case studies, the two areas closest to the core urban area (Mdantsane and Seshego) have the higher HDI (0.60). Interestingly, in 1996, Mdantsane had a higher HDI than the black population in East London, which could indicate large-scale under-investment in Duncan Village to ensure that Mdantsane would be the more attractive place in which to settle.

## PEOPLE LIVING IN POVERTY

Between 1996 and 2013, the growth in the number of people living in poverty in the four case studies was considerably lower than in the core urban areas. In Seshego, the number of people living in poverty decreased by 0.8% per annum between 1996 and 2013, largely because of effective integration but also because the corridor development between Polokwane City and Seshego accommodated new urbanisation. The annual growth in numbers of people living in poverty was very low in Mdantsane (0.08%) and Botshabelo (0.9%) but higher in Winterveld/Ga-Rankuwa (3.5%). During the same period, the annual growth in numbers of people living in poverty was much higher in the core urban areas: 3.9% in Bloemfontein, 2.9% in East London, 4.3% in Polokwane City and 9.7% in Pretoria. These figures confirm the migration trends and imply that the poverty nodes are shifting from displaced settlements to the core economic areas.

Nevertheless, the percentage of people living in poverty is still considerably higher in the displaced settlements than in the core economic areas, as reflected in Figure 9.

**Figure 9:** Percentage of people living in poverty (2013)




Source: *Global Insight (2014)*



## HOUSEHOLD EXPENDITURE ON FOOD

The share of household expenditure used to purchase food is commonly used as an indicator of poverty. The higher the share spent on food, the more acute the poverty. Household expenditure on food was found to be consistently higher in the four displaced settlements than among the black population in the core economic areas (Figure 10).

**Figure 10:** Percentages of household expenditure spent on food




This suggests that while poor migrants are moving to the core areas, the displaced settlements continue to have high levels of poverty and thus require social investment or support. Yet again, the displaced settlements with the largest differences in poverty levels compared to their respective municipalities were the two areas farthest away from the core economic areas: Botshabelo and Winterveld.



## EMPLOYMENT AND UNEMPLOYMENT

Figure 11 shows the change in number of people employed in the four case study areas and their respective municipalities between 1996 and 2013.

**Figure 11:** People employed (1996 and 2013)




Source: *Global Insight (2014)*

Between 1996 and 2013, formal employment increased in the urban core areas and decreased in the four displaced settlements. The smallest decrease was in Seshego, probably because it is close to and spatially integrated with its core economic area, Polokwane City. Seshego also managed to retain the largest percentage of formal jobs, which may also be because the area is less dependent on manufacturing.

During the apartheid era, large numbers were employed in manufacturing, especially the textile industry, as a result of government decentralisation subsidies (Botshabelo, Mdantsane and Winterveld) or industrialisation efforts, as was the case in Pietersburg, to the benefit of Seshego (SACN, 2014). Figure 12 shows how employment in manufacturing has changed since 1996.

**Figure 12:** Employment in manufacturing (1996 and 2013)




Since 1996, the reduction in manufacturing employment has been drastic. By 2013, only 15% of the manufacturing jobs in Botshabelo remained, 20% in Mdantsane, 38% in Winterveld/Ga-Rankuwa and 51% in Seshego. Increased jobs in the vehicle manufacturing industry (an industrial subsector supported by government) somewhat countered the loss of jobs in Mdantsane and Winterveld/Ga-Rankuwa. Similarly, the continued industrialisation of Polokwane meant that new developments made up for the manufacturing jobs lost in Seshego.

The textile industry has seen the steepest decline: of the textile jobs in 1996, by 2013 only 3.7% remained in Mdantsane, 8.5% in Botshabelo, 7.7% in Seshego and 30.8% in Winterveld/Ga-Rankuwa. This decline was far greater than in the respective municipalities, where the textile industry managed to retain more jobs than in the four displaced settlements.


The unemployment rate grew more slowly in the four displaced settlements than in the larger municipal areas, probably because low-income people could settle closer to the core economic areas where most job opportunities are found. Between 1996 and 2013, the unemployment rate increased by 9.1% (from 18.8% to 27.9%) in Mangaung and by 7.3% (from 28.8% to 36.1%) in Botshabelo, but (interestingly) declined in both Seshego and Mdantsane (Figure 13).

**Figure 13: Unemployment rates (1996 and 2013)**



Against the backdrop of declining formal employment, the research looked into whether new employment opportunities have been created in the household sector. Although this type of employment does not contribute directly to the economy, it does provide lower-skilled workers with employment opportunities. The data in respect of employment in the household sector is represented in Figure 14.

**Figure 14: Employment in the household sector (1996 and 2013)**



Source: Stats SA (2013)



Between 1996 and 2013, employment in the household sector decreased in Botshabelo, Mdantsane and Winterveld but increased substantially in the four municipal areas as well as in Seshego. This suggests that being close to the core economic area and to the social networks of employed people is pivotal to finding employment in the household sector.

## SPATIAL INTEGRATION

Of the four case studies, only one – Seshego – has successfully achieved some spatial integration with its core economic area (Polokwane, previously Pietersburg). This is because just 10 km separate Seshego and Polokwane, a good access road links the two towns, the area has a relatively flat topography, and appropriate planning began in the early 1990s. In addition, no existing landowners had vested interests that threatened the corridor development and infill developments. Another contributing factor is Polokwane's large-scale economic growth since the early 1990s, in particular a retail sector boom as a result of the collapse of the Zimbabwean economy.

In Mdantsane, spatial conglomeration seems to be shifting northwards towards King William's Town, where most new developments are taking place. However, the Mdantsane area's topography is likely to make new and infill developments more difficult than in Polokwane.

Infill development will probably never materialise in Botshabelo and Winterveld because of the distances from Bloemfontein and Pretoria respectively. Botshabelo's spatial integration with Mangaung will also be limited because of the municipal spatial plans, which state that no developments should take place in the southern parts of Botshabelo (Mandela View was developed on land originally earmarked for industrial development in Bloemindustria) and emphasise the integration of the open spaces between Botshabelo and Thaba Nchu.


## PRIVATE INVESTMENT IN HOUSING

In all four displaced settlements private investment in housing is ongoing, albeit in different forms and to various degrees (Figure 15). Botshabelo has seen the highest increase in the average house size (based on number of rooms per house), increasing from 3.02 to 3.95 rooms between 1996 and 2011. During the same period, formal houses in Botshabelo increased by almost 20% (from nearly 60% to just below 80%).

In Mdantsane, between 1996 and 2011 the average house size increased from 3.26 to 3.97 rooms, while formal houses increased by only 2.5%. Seshego experienced marginal increases in average house size but a 24% increase in formal housing units (from 67.1% in 1996 to 91.1% in 2011). In Winterveld, the average house size declined slightly, while the percentage of formal houses increased slightly, probably

because of the new houses constructed under the Housing Subsidy Programme. Despite general declines in household size, housing investment seems to have continued unabated in at least three of the four settlements. This may be because of a desire to create a place of retirement, an increasing experience of these places as 'home' or maybe even a lack of alternatives.

**Figure 15:** House size and household size, 1996 and 2011




The improvements in Botshabelo suggest that increased investments in basic infrastructure, which result in private housing investments, have locked people into the location. The interviews revealed that moving is indeed difficult for some households.

## TRANSPORT EXPENDITURE

With the exception of Seshego, the case study areas had subsidised bus systems. Botshabelo and Winterveld have recorded substantial declines in the number of people commuting on a daily basis, while conflict between the taxi industry and the bus companies in Mdantsane eventually led to the bus service being discontinued. However, the existing subsidy remains critical for ensuring access to employment in the main urban areas. Any discontinuation of the subsidy is sure to have a detrimental effect on the existing commuters. Figure 16 provides an overview of money spent on public transport.

**Figure 16:** Percentage of household expenditure on public transport (1996 and 2013)




Source: Global Insight (2014)

As Figure 16 illustrates, households in the displaced settlements spend a much higher proportion of their expenditure on public transport compared to households in their respective municipalities. Households in Winterveld/Ga-Rankuwa and Mdantsane spend over 100% more than households in Pretoria and East London, respectively. These figures could be even higher in practice, given that Botshabelo and Winterveld/Ga-Rankuwa still have bus subsidies.

## SCHOOLS AND EDUCATION

The quality of the schools played a crucial role in creating (or not creating) a sense of place in at least two of the case studies (Botshabelo and Winterveld). Learners were attracted to schools in Winterveld by the considerable investment in the school system and the school feeding scheme. The overall quality of education also doubtlessly improved, which contributed to a positive sense of place. The opposite happened in Botshabelo, where schools are perceived as underperforming (despite one or two good secondary schools). At least three schools in the area have closed, as children attend schools elsewhere (for example in Bloemfontein), and the outflow of people and internal migration to the northern parts of Botshabelo continues.


**Figure 17:** Percentage of people without any education, 1996 and 2011



The education levels in the displaced settlements are generally lower than in their respective municipalities, despite a considerable improvement since 1996. For example, in Botshabelo, the percentage of people with no schooling has dropped from 20% in 1996 to 5.8% in 2011 (compared to 4.4% for the Mangaung Metropolitan Municipality). Of the four areas, Winterveld has the highest percentage of people without schooling – 10.8% in 2011 but down from 26% in 1996. Compared to their respective municipalities, three of the settlements have substantially lower percentages of people with post-Grade 12 qualifications: Botshabelo (3.3%), Mdantsane (7.1%) and Winterveld (3.5%). The exception is Seshego, where 17.4% of people have post-Grade 12 qualification, compared to 12% for Polokwane, which again suggests Seshego’s functional integration with the larger Polokwane Local Municipality.



## PART 4: SOME LESSONS FOR PROGRAMMES AND POLICY



The four case studies are a stark reminder that the spatial fragmentation of economic regions – a product of apartheid planning – continues to hamper development. In reflecting on the lessons for programmes and policy, a fundamental concern is the absence of an integrated rationale for investment decisions in these settlements.

*A fundamental concern is the absence of an integrated rationale for investment decisions in these settlements.*



### 1 DISPLACED SETTLEMENTS HAVE MULTIPLE FUNCTIONAL ROLES

Historically, under apartheid, displaced settlements were a means of addressing urbanisation, as dormitory towns intended to keep black urbanisation at some distance from the main urban centres and administratively linked to the former homelands. Post-apartheid conceptualisation of these displaced settlements has been rather vague and diverse, possibly because their functional roles are also changing. Many of these settlements could remain dormitory towns with little potential to develop their economies (Crankshaw and Parnell, 1996) – the Mangaung IDP still refers to Botshabelo as a dormitory town (a place where people sleep). Unlike Botshabelo, Seshego has integrated into the larger urban centre, whereas Winterveld is a rural development node in Gauteng. Both Mdantsane and Botshabelo seem to have developed other functional roles that are distinct from their historical role. For instance, as retirement places (with greater numbers of elderly people moving there) or for families, or as places of social care (because of the substantial housing investments over the past decade and the high number of social grantees).

Local planning frameworks need to understand, contextualise and incorporate the multi-functional roles of these settlements, even if their economic potential is limited. Examples of these functional roles are:

- The dormitory town, as commonly portrayed in documents such as the Mangaung IDP.
- The rural town, e.g. the Winterveld case study, which is a role that is deeply embedded in the area's development.
- The place of caring (for children and the aged), especially where relatively high densities would help make the area economically more viable, such as in Mdantsane and Botshabelo.
- The rural home where family investments are made (e.g. Botshabelo)
- An integrated suburb within a larger urban area (e.g. Seshego)

This nuanced understanding of places can lead to more appropriate and strategic investments into these areas that begin to work towards the vision of a post-apartheid, spatially transformed city.

## 2

## THE QUEST FOR SPATIAL INTEGRATION AND IMPROVED DENSITIES CONTINUES

The notion of spatial integration is deeply entrenched in the post-apartheid policy agenda, and the need for greater densities is a logical consequence of this integration. Although densities have increased in Johannesburg and Tshwane (albeit from a low basis), achieving spatial integration and increased densities has been difficult. At the same time, migration trends are following job creation trends – 'people are voting with their feet', leaving localities with limited economic potential for the larger metropolitan areas. Elements of new employment creation are visible within metropolitan areas and municipal core areas related to the four case studies. It should be noted that:

- Urban densities in the displaced settlements are relatively high and, in the case of Seshego, Mdantsane and Botshabelo, higher than the municipal average. Yet all four settlements have low/slow population growth and have not managed to create new jobs, despite the job creation in their respective core urban areas (i.e. Pretoria, Bloemfontein, East London and Polokwane).
- New housing investments in these areas are probably the reason for the relatively high urban densities persisting. However, neither these new investments nor the relatively high densities have been accompanied by new employment opportunities.
- Of the four case studies, Seshego is probably the only place where functional integration has been achieved. This functional integration is the result of its close proximity to Polokwane, its role as the former black township of Pietersburg and because deliberate attempts were made to integrate the old Pietersburg and Seshego since the early 1990s.
- Spatial integration is being achieved through people leaving these settlements and settling in the economic core, especially in Botshabelo and Mdantsane. The continued existence of a subsidised bus system between Botshabelo and Bloemfontein has probably reduced the impact of resettlement towards Bloemfontein. However, the many new stands being made available in and

near Bloemfontein (compared to a dearth of stands in Botshabelo) should be seen as a means of achieving spatial integration and of accommodating people in the economic core (where some jobs have been created).

Innovative ways are needed to increase densities and achieve spatial integration within the regional context. This will require explicitly articulating the spatial integration plan between the displaced settlements and their respective municipality.

### 3

## LARGE-SCALE INFRASTRUCTURE INVESTMENTS HAVE LOCKED PEOPLE IN

All four case studies have received large-scale government investments, supported by local political pressure and amalgamation through municipal demarcation since 1993. The large-scale investments suggest that a significant degree of spatial justice has been pursued at some basic level. However, what is not clear is whether other principles, particularly spatial efficiency and quality, are being accomplished and whether government has compromised efficiency for justice, or is this simply the price to pay for the apartheid spatial legacy.

A concern is that continued investment and subsidisation serve to lock people into these areas, which were planned under apartheid to displace urbanisation from the core urban areas. This is probably not applicable to Seshego because of the short distance from Polokwane City and its historical role as the main 'black township' under apartheid (as well as a displaced settlement). However, apart from Winterveld between 2001 and 2011, all four settlements have seen large outmigration and significant job losses, and at the same time considerable infrastructure and housing investments. In most of these areas, substantial private housing investments have also materialised. Household investment into housing (seen especially in Botshabelo) may even exaggerate the lock in. Such investments come on the back of substantial improvements in the basic infrastructure of the four case-study areas. The continued bus subsidy (in Botshabelo and Winterveld) largely reinforces the lock in.

Despite remarkable achievements in delivering basic services, the broader investment debate does not appear to have been considered as part of these developments. Key questions in this broader debate include:

- What is the strategic approach intended for addressing spatial dislocation, other than simply maintaining or even entrenching it?
- At what point will such investment be sufficient?
- Should investments in basic infrastructure go beyond basic service levels? What are the arguments in favour of exceeding (or adhering to) only basic levels in certain poorly located areas?
- Are state-driven investment models sustainable in the long run? Is there an intent to secure a return on investment through municipal service charges or property taxes? If not, then what is envisaged for how the municipalities would function?

- How can various subsidy systems be integrated to avoid reinforcing the spatial marginalisation created under apartheid? For example, the study found that providing a state transport subsidy for commuting and housing subsidies largely reinforce apartheid spatial patterns.

## 4

### AN OPEN DEBATE ON TRANSPORT AND HOUSING SUBSIDIES IS NEEDED

The IUDF suggests that an open debate is needed concerning subsidies in South Africa, and the intended and unintended consequences of different subsidies. The debate should be broadened because:

- Subsidies are associated either directly or indirectly with the large-scale investments in the four settlements. For example, infrastructure or housing subsidies generally involve some form of capital grant.
- The continued bus subsidy (Botshabelo and Winterveld) serves to perpetuate the subsidisation of peripheral locations, which probably is the single most important reason why people are prevented from migrating from Botshabelo to Bloemfontein.
- In interrogating the rationales for the transport subsidy and the housing subsidy, how wise is using a bus subsidy and a settlement grant in the same place, and where acknowledged inefficiency (poor location) is effectively being locked in.

## 5

### TENSION BETWEEN SERVICE DELIVERY AND STRATEGIC SPATIAL PLANNING

An integrated and strategic planning response to these displaced settlements is needed. The state has made noteworthy progress in delivering services and addressing service backlogs in these areas, especially since the mid-1990s and in 2001 when these displaced settlements merged with their respective economic areas resulting in increased institutional capacity. Yet the danger is that extending service delivery, particularly housing delivery and major infrastructure investments in questionable locations, may in fact reinforce the existing spatial inequalities. The NDP (NPC, 2012: 279) identifies ‘the lack of an overarching strategic approach to spatial development’ as a major shortcoming for the country. Similarly, these four displaced settlements need a strategic approach that would entail reconciling different subsidies and asking questions about long-term viability. Only Botshabelo has attempted this (Tomlinson and Krige, 1997), although the provincial authorities’ response to the report was decidedly lukewarm and the basic principles introduced in the Botshabelo Investment Study are unlikely to remain in the institutional memory of the existing bureaucracy.

The difficult question of how to redress the locational challenge and difficult histories of these displaced settlements is yet to be resolved. In many ways, their situation has been exacerbated or at least entrenched by deferring the difficult questions and choices.



# CONCLUDING REMARKS

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Like previous differentiation studies, this study explored an important issue, using qualitative and quantitative evidence to enhance understanding, to raise questions and gain fresh perspectives. All of these draw attention to policy and planning and stimulate conversation, which will hopefully result in a better-informed agenda for policy and action. More specifically, in line with the previous studies on differentiation, the case is indeed made for differentiated planning. In fact, this report shows that, in practice, some forms of differentiation do indeed already exist (for example the transport subsidy). The report also argues that the high levels of complexity of these displaced settlements require a holistic planning approach in which differentiation is a central component.



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
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